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In the literature on strategic alliances, trust is often positioned as the magic ingredient in alliance 
success. Typically, trust is treated in the literature as a residual term in the statistical models, neither 
operationalized nor measured. This paper is important because it operationalizes and measures trust as 
a multidimensional construct, which is both causally antecedent o strategic alliance, flexibility, and the 
outcome of characteristics of the alliance partners. Ibelieve the field needs more theoretical and empirical 
precision regarding trust, as exemplified in this paper. 
Mitchell P. Koza 
Abstract 
Utilizing a model drawn from both transaction cost economics 
and social exchange theory, we analyze determinants of stra- 
tegic flexibility in a sample of strategic alliances involved in 
joint development agreements or joint research pacts. Findings 
indicate that, in general, determinants suggested by transaction 
cost economics provided flexibility in modification and inflex- 
ibility in exit. From social exchange theory, trust was found to 
be positively related to both types of flexibility while another 
component of social exchange theory, dependence, was found 
to be negatively related to the strategic flexibility of the alliance. 
Results also found that factors suggested by both transaction 
cost economic theory and social exchange theory were related 
to the concept of trust. Economic constraints as suggested by 
transaction cost economics were positively related to trust be- 
tween the alliance partners while dependence was negatively 
related to trust. Additionally, the quality of communication and 
the existence of shared values were positively related to trust 
between the exchange partners. Results provide support for the 
role of determinants from both transaction cost economics and 
social exchange theory in the flexibility of strategic alliances. 
(Strategic Alliances; Flexibility; Trust) 
The emergence of new global competitors, the conver- 
gence of high-technology industries, and the increasing 
speed and cost of technological development promise an 
increasingly uncertain environment for firms (Hagedoom 
and Schakenraad 1994). These dynamic competitive 
forces call for organizations to be efficient, innovative, 
and flexible (Duncan 1976), suggesting that processes for 
ensuring strategic flexibility may be a crucial element of 
strategic management (Evans 1991). This may be par- 
ticularly true in fast-paced industries or hypercompetitive 
environments characterized by rapid technological 
change, shortened product life cycles, increasing com- 
petitive rivalry, and global competition (Volberda 1996). 
Many organizations have found that it is almost impos- 
sible to address these competitive forces without some 
major internal and external structural adjustments that 
provide greater strategic flexibility. 
Faced with greater environmental uncertainty, firms 
may want to avoid long entanglements that could prove 
to be wrong later and will instead favor more flexible, 
less binding relationships (Crocker and Masten 1988) 
such as strategic alliances. Interorganizational relation- 
ships such as strategic alliances provide the firm with 
greater ability to pursue new developments in technolo- 
gies, products, and markets and thus allow it to initiate 
or adapt to competitive change (Volberda 1996). Porter 
and Fuller (1986) argue that partnerships and collabora- 
tions are a more rapid means of competitive repositioning 
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than internal development, and are less costly and more 
flexible than mergers. Similarly, Balakrishnan and Koza 
(1995) view joint ventures as transitional, short-lived 
strategies. Support for these arguments comes from Kelly 
and Amburgey (1991), who distinguish between core and 
peripheral activities within a firm and provide evidence 
that in uncertain situations where change may be neces- 
sary, the firm will benefit by utilizing peripheral devices, 
such as strategic alliances. 
The rate of alliance formation has increased, particu- 
larly in high-technology industries where R&D is char- 
acterized by substantial uncertainty (Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad 1992). And yet, research examining alliance 
formation and failure have found that anywhere from 
30%-70% of alliances are considered failures by one or 
more of the partners or break up prematurely (Fortune 
1992). As such, increasing scholar attention on the sub- 
ject of strategic alliances has led to research examining 
the motives for collaboration (Hladik 1988, Oliver 1990) 
and the governance structure of these alliances (Gulati, 
1995, Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995), as well as the fac- 
tors that lead to their success (Mohr and Spekman 1994, 
Parkhe 1993), stability (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Heide 
and John 1988, 1990), or continuity (Olk and Young 
1997). 
As a result of the failure of many alliances, understand- 
ing the factors related to their success or continuity has 
become an important subject of investigation. Because of 
the rapidity and frequency with which environmental 
changes occur, the benefit or success of a strategic alli- 
ance may be closely associated with its strategic flexibil- 
ity and the ability to adjust the relationship to changes, 
including the timely termination of the relationship when 
the alliance no longer meets the partners' needs 
(Niederkofler 1991). Thus, the flexibility of a strategic 
alliance has been argued to be one of the key factors 
related to the success or "usefulness" of an alliance (e.g., 
Porter and Fuller 1986, Harrigan, 1986). However, be- 
cause few studies have been systematically designed to 
study flexibility in a strategic alliance setting 
(Fiegenbaum and Kamani 1991), there appears to be a 
need to examine the underlying factors that lead to stra- 
tegic alliance flexibility. 
This study attempts to address these shortcomings by 
utilizing a comprehensive framework wherein both trans- 
action cost economics and social exchange theory are 
used to examine two elements of strategic flexibility in 
strategic alliances: the flexibility to modify the alliance 
and the flexibility to exit the alliance relationship when 
the alliance is performing poorly. This model is investi- 
gated within a sample of strategic alliances representing 
joint development or joint research pacts on information 
technology. Analytical techniques are utilized that allow 
for the simultaneous estimation of the relationship be- 
tween underlying factors suggested by transaction cost 
economics and social exchange theory and the flexibility 
of a strategic alliance. 
Determinants of Strategic Alliance 
Flexibility 
Strategic Flexibility 
In a dynamic and turbulent environment, strategic deci- 
sions may need to be continually reexamined. Respond- 
ing to a wide variety of changes in the competitive en- 
vironment necessitates an adaptive capability or 
flexibility on the part of the organization (Volberda 
1996). Strategic flexibility is generally considered to be 
a construct with multiple dimensions (Evans 1991) and 
has been defined as the ability to adapt to environmental 
changes (Aaker and Macarenhas 1984), to change game 
plans (Harrigan 1985), to precipitate intentional changes, 
to continuously respond to unanticipated changes, and to 
adjust to the unexpected consequences of predictable 
changes (Bahrami 1992). 
In the strategic alliance literature, two general types of 
flexibility have been specified: modification and exit. The 
first, modification, refers to the ability of partners to ad- 
just their behaviors or the terms of the agreement in re- 
sponse to changes in the environment or to the needs of 
their partners (e.g., Heide and John, 1992). Given 
bounded rationality, it is impossible to contractually spec- 
ify every possible contingency involved in managing a 
strategic alliance (Williamson 1985). Thus, the eventual 
viability and success of the alliance may depend on the 
ability of partners to observe and respect informal obli- 
gations of the relationship and to modify the terms of the 
alliance (formal or informal) for continued value creation. 
The second type of strategic flexibility is the relative 
ease of exit from an alliance in which the partner is no 
longer satisfied or that no longer meets the partner's 
needs. According to Harrigan and Newman (1990), the 
needs and strengths of each partner in a joint venture are 
subject to constant change. These changes, then, often 
enhance or diminish that partner's interest in the alli- 
ance's activities. As such, the flexibility to be able to ter- 
minate or exit from the relationship becomes an important 
strategic concern for individual partners in alliances. 
Determinants of Strategic Flexibility 
Two theoretical perspectives were utilized in developing 
models of strategic flexibility-transaction cost econom- 
ics and social exchange theory. Transaction cost econom- 
ics has been found to be a useful theoretical perspective 
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from which to examine many facets of strategic alliances, 
including structure (Gulati 1995), continuity (Olk and 
Young 1997), and stability or survival (Parkhe 1993). Ac- 
cording to transaction cost theory, partners within stra- 
tegic alliances are assumed to have the potential for op- 
portunistic behavior. Thus, it is necessary to secure 
commitment to the alliance through the investment of 
specific assets and other types of economic "hostages" 
(Parkhe 1993, Williamson 1985). 
While economic theories have been used to explain 
intra- and interorganizational phenomena, there is cur- 
rently a growing debate between economists and behav- 
ioralists about the extent to which economic analyses 
alone extend our knowledge of organizations (Barney 
1990, Donaldson 1990). Organization theorists have chal- 
lenged the assumptions underlying economic models that 
often overlook trust and power and exaggerate the influ- 
ence of opportunism in organizations (Jones 1983, 
Perrow 1981). Consequently, although economic models 
have predominantly been used to examine the nature of 
strategic alliances, researchers have argued that social ex- 
change theory may be a more useful theoretical perspec- 
tive for the investigation of strategic alliances (Graham 
1988). 
In addition to factors suggested by transaction cost eco- 
nomics, social exchange theorists consider it important to 
understand the social context in which those decisions are 
made (e.g., Cook 1977, Cook and Emerson 1978, 
Granovetter 1985). Trust represents one such important 
social context factor. As Granovetter explains, many at- 
tempts at rational, economic action are really "embedded" 
in social relations, and he stresses "the role of concrete 
personal relations and structures of such relationships in 
generating trust and discouraging malfeasance" (1985, p. 
490). In addition, the dependence of organizations on 
each other as suggested by both social exchange theorists 
(e.g., Blau 1964) and organization theorists (e.g., Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978) represents another important social 
context factor. 
Transaction cost economics and social exchange theory 
together may provide a more comprehensive explanation 
of the strategic flexibility of alliances. In addition, the 
interrelationships among the theoretical determinants of 
flexibility may provide an even more thorough under- 
standing of strategic alliance flexibility. 
Transaction Cost Economics and Strategic 
Flexibility 
According to transaction cost economics, the costs asso- 
ciated with various organizational structures constitute 
the critical factor determining the choice of transacting 
mode. Transaction cost theory has been used to address 
many issues related to strategic alliances, including com- 
mitment (e.g., Parkhe 1993) and stability (e.g., Heide and 
John 1988, 1990). Partners within strategic alliances are 
assumed to have the potential for opportunistic behavior 
(Reich and Mankin 1986). Transaction cost economists 
have recognized the proliferation of these intermediate 
governance structures and suggest that they are main- 
tained by economic weapons such as hostages and other 
credible economic commitments. The effect of such eco- 
nomic commitments is to create a locked-in condition 
(Katz 1989) which in turn promotes behaviors that ensure 
the continuance and "mutual forbearance" of the partner- 
ship (Buckley and Casson 1988). Specifically, economic 
constraints such as the investment of specific assets and 
hostage arrangements may be utilized to reduce the po- 
tential for opportunism by locking partners into a strategic 
alliance with the expected long-term gains from main- 
taining the relationship exceeding the potential short-term 
gains from opportunism or defection (Parkhe 1993, 
Williamson 1985). We examine three factors suggested 
by transaction cost economics as determinants of an al- 
liance's flexibility: asset specificity, balanced asset spec- 
ificity, and hostages. 
Asset Specificity. Asset specificity refers to the nature 
of the transferability of assets from one use to another. 
"Specific assets are those whose value is less if switched 
to alternative transactions and consequently whose value 
is not fully salvageable if the relation breaks down" 
(Lorenz 1988, p. 199). As assets are created or modified 
for a particular use, they may have severely diminished 
value in other settings. Thus, as Klein et al. (1978) have 
argued, firms become locked into a course of action when 
investments in specific assets have been made. 
Asset specificity may serve to tie members together by 
subverting the flexibility of pursuing other alternatives or 
severing the interorganizational relationship. An organi- 
zation may become locked in to an alliance with another 
company as it devotes more assets to the relationship. 
These idiosyncratic investments lose value upon transfer, 
so exchange partners may become committed to making 
the existing relationship succeed (Parkhe 1993, 
Williamson 1985). This may be particularly true for in- 
tangible factors such as managerial skills and technical 
know-how. Thus, intangible asset specificity should 
prove to have a much more significant influence on the 
strategic flexibility of the alliance. Consequently, firms 
may find it in their own best interest to continue the re- 
lationship due to their investments in the alliance (Heide 
and John 1992, Parkhe 1993). To protect these invest- 
ments, firms may be more willing to be flexible in terms 
of modifying the agreement rather than causing it to fail 
by being unwilling to adjust. 
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In an intraorganizational context, specific assets have 
been found to bind organizations to a particular strategy 
or course of action. Ghemawat (1991) described this phe- 
nomenon as "lock-in." Assets created or purchased for 
the purpose of a particular strategic course of action may 
not be easily transferable to other courses of action. As 
such, these assets may lead to lock-in even when the al- 
liance is no longer satisfying the partner. Lei and Slocum 
(1992), for instance, argue that strategic alliances can 
serve to increase dependence on other firms if the orga- 
nization, through heavy involvement, gives away its own 
skills and know-how without learning from the partner. 
In the case where these commitments to the relationship 
are based on contractual specifications or other economic 
constraints, the flexibility to exit the relationship even 
when it no longer fits the needs of the partner may be 
difficult. 
As a result of the above discussion, it is proposed that 
the investment of specific assets into the alliance will be 
positively related to flexibility in modifying the terms of 
the alliance agreement, but negatively related to exit flex- 
ibility. 
HYPOTHESIS 1 a. Asset specificity is positively related 
to the strategic flexibility of an alliance, measured in 
terms of modification. 
HYPOTHESIS lb. Asset specificity is negatively re- 
lated to the strategicflexibility of an alliance, measured 
in terms of exit. 
Balanced Asset Specificity. Balanced asset specificity 
refers to the extent to which each partner has contributed 
equal levels of specific assets to the alliance. While pre- 
vious research has separately examined the specificity of 
the assets contributed by each partner to the exchange 
(Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995), this study utilizes the 
concept of balanced asset specificity that is a unique at- 
tribute of the dyadic relationships examined here. This 
conceptualization of specific assets invested explores 
more fully the mutual commitments that may exist be- 
tween partners in an alliance. One strategy for creating a 
self-enforcing agreement is for both parties involved to 
make "credible commitments" to the relationship 
(Williamson 1985), for example, by means of invest- 
ments in specific assets (Anderson and Weitz 1989) or 
other relationships with the partner (Kogut 1989). Be- 
cause alliances are mediated only partly through prices, 
parties demand mutual commitments from their partners 
in the form of alternative or complementary technology, 
market information or access, as well as reputation or 
credibility (Mody 1993). A dependence condition exists 
(Barney and Ouchi 1986) which, if balanced, represents 
a mutual safeguard (Williamson 1985) and a collective 
incentive to maintain the relationship. 
The general incentive to maintain the relationship can 
manifest itself in different ways. One specific outcome of 
this balance of assets contributed is that the parties will 
have a joint motivation to show "forbearance" (Buckley 
and Casson 1988) or flexibility in response to changing 
circumstances. The existence of balanced investments 
serves to align the respective parties' interests and pro- 
motes flexibility as a means of preserving the relationship 
(Heide 1994). Thus, it is proposed that the existence of 
balanced asset specificity will be positively related to 
flexibility in modifying the terms of the alliance agree- 
ment. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Balanced asset specificity is posi- 
tively related to the strategic flexibility of an alliance, 
measured in terms of modification. 
Hostages. Hostage arrangements refer to the exis- 
tence of other current relationships between the partners 
to the focal alliance. These hostages are another type of 
safeguard discussed in transaction cost economics as a 
protection against a partner's opportunistic behavior 
(Williamson 1983). The utilization of hostages as a safe- 
guard implies that there is the possibility of penalties for 
any opportunistic behavior on the part of the partners in- 
volved. Researchers have argued that "mutual forbear- 
ance" (refraining from cheating) is necessary in main- 
taining strong current relations (e.g., Buckley and Casson 
1988). The existence of other current relationships (i.e., 
hostages) is one method for facilitating that mutual for- 
bearance. Hostages, then, can be in the form of other cur- 
rent alliances or the expectation of entering into other 
relationships in the future. 
Williamson (1985) proposed that organizations in- 
volved in more than one alliance with the same partners 
have created a "mutual hostage" arrangement. Here, the 
failure of one relationship may threaten the strength or 
viability of others. Kogut (1989) provided empirical sup- 
port for the strength of multiple ties. He found that in- 
volvement in more than one collaborative relationship led 
to the stability of the focal joint venture. 
As a result, alliance members with multiple current re- 
lationships among themselves are considered to have eco- 
nomic hostages and are less likely to sever the focal al- 
liance relationship and are more likely to be willing to 
modify the existing relationship in order to ensure its sur- 
vival. Consequently, it is proposed that hostage arrange- 
ments (multiple relationships) will be positively related 
to flexibility in modifying the alliance and will be nega- 
tively related to flexibility in exiting the alliance. 
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HYPOTHESIS 3a. The existence of hostage arrange- 
ments is positively related to the strategicflexibility of an 
alliance, measured in terms of modification. 
HYPOTHESIS 3b. The existence of hostage arrange- 
ments is negatively related to the strategic flexibility of 
an alliance, measured in terms of exit. 
Social Exchange Theory and Strategic Flexibility 
Social exchange theory suggests that two specific aspects 
of organizational context may be influential in under- 
standing the flexibility of relationships between organi- 
zations. First, that the trust between the organizations will 
have a positive impact on the desire and ability of the 
partners to adjust to changing environmental demands 
through modification or termination of the agreement 
(Lorenz 1988, Mody 1993). Second, that the dependence 
of the partner on the alliance may also be an important 
factor that influences the flexibility in using a strategic 
alliance. In general, researchers have argued that depen- 
dency may serve to commit the partner to the alliance, 
thereby increasing the longevity of the relationship 
(Parkhe 1993). 
Trust. Researchers in sociology and organization the- 
ory have emphasized the importance of trust in social and 
economic exchange. While the study of trust has its roots 
in psychology and social psychology and is intuitively an 
interpersonal phenomenon, with many sociologists ar- 
guing that expectations of trust do ultimately reside 
within individuals, many management scholars have 
taken this idea of interpersonal trust and extended it to 
the organizational level (e.g., Gulati 1995, Zaheer et al. 
1998). Justification for this extension of interpersonal 
trust to the organizational level comes from many 
sources. For example, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argue 
that although the individuals within an organization may 
be transitory, their role definitions are stable and endur- 
ing. The trust, then, may reside within the roles and rou- 
tines of the organization and not necessarily with only the 
individual. Recently, the concept of trust has been utilized 
in the study of joint ventures (e.g., Gulati 1995) and in 
the marketing channels literature to examine governance 
(e.g., Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995) and commitment 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994). Anderson and Narus (1990) 
suggest that once trust is established, firms learn that joint 
efforts will lead to outcomes that exceed what the firm 
would achieve had they acted solely in their own best 
interests. 
While trust has been defined in many different ways to 
address many different organizational research questions, 
one that is consistent with research on interorganizational 
relationships is that of Dodgson (1993), who defined trust 
as a state of mind, an expectation held by one trading 
partner about another, that the other will behave in a pre- 
dictable and mutually acceptable manner. As suggested 
by Koza and Lewin (1998), "for trust to be a useful con- 
cept its principle components must be identified, opera- 
tionalized and measured" (p. 259). Thus, to capture the 
multidimensionality of the concept of trust, similar to 
Zaheer et al. (1998), we characterize trust as a construct 
based on three components-dependability, predictabil- 
ity, and faith. Dependability refers to expectations that 
the partner will act in the alliance's best interest, pre- 
dictability refers to consistency of actions by the partner, 
while faith refers to the belief that the partner will not act 
opportunistically, even in unforeseen or novel situations. 
It has been argued that trust is so important to relational 
exchange that it is considered to be a central feature of a 
strategic partnership (Mohr and Spekman 1994). Because 
investments in alliances entail a vulnerability, parties will 
seek ways to partner with partners that exhibit character- 
istics of dependability and predictability, even in unfore- 
seen situations (faith). In the literature on interorganiza- 
tional relationships, there has been a somewhat consistent 
argument that the existence of relationships based on the 
trust between partners has a positive impact on the ability 
of the partners to adjust to changing environmental de- 
mands or unintended problems that may arise. For ex- 
ample, Lorenz (1988) argues that partnerships that exhibit 
trust will survive greater stress and will display greater 
adaptability. Similarly, in examining the evolution of co- 
operative arrangements, Doz (1996) found that alliances 
that have developed trusting relationships over time are 
more likely to be adaptable and to survive for longer pe- 
riods of time. Thus, relationships based on trust, as mea- 
sured by dependability, predictability, and faith, should 
exhibit more flexibility in decision making and operations 
than those that are not. 
In addition, as the needs and strengths of each partner 
in its major activities are subject to continual change, the 
partners' interest in the strategic alliance may diminish. 
If a relationship exhibits trust, but confronts dramatic 
changes in the market indicating that the alliance should 
be dissolved, partners may break up that particular alli- 
ance but form a new one (Mody 1993). As a result of the 
arguments above, it is proposed that trust between orga- 
nizations in an alliance, as indicted by the partner's per- 
ception of dependability, predictability, and faith, will be 
positively related to flexibility in both modification and 
exit. 
HYPOTHESIS 4a. Trust is positively related to the stra- 
tegic flexibility of an alliance, measured in terms of mod- 
ification. 
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HYPOTHESIS 4b. Trust is positively related to the 
strategic flexibility of an alliance, measured in terms of 
exit. 
Dependence. In addition to trust, power and its cor- 
ollary dependence are important elements in social ex- 
change. Imbalances of obligations incurred in transac- 
tions produce differences in power and arise in the course 
of competition for scarce goods (Blau 1964). According 
to Blau (1964) power may be defined as: 
... the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to 
modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner 
which he desires, and to prevent his own conduct being modified 
in the manner in which he does not. Power refers to all kinds 
of influence between persons or groups, including those exer- 
cised in economic transactions (p.1 15). 
By supplying demanded services to others, a person can 
establish power over others. And, if those services cannot 
be obtained elsewhere, dependence will emerge. 
Social exchange theorists (e.g., Blau 1964) and orga- 
nization theorists (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) have 
built on a model of "power-dependence" developed by 
Emerson (1962). Resource dependence theory has argued 
that an organization acts to reduce environmental uncer- 
tainty (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Uncertainty is gener- 
ated by resource scarcity and by a lack of perfect knowl- 
edge about environmental fluctuations and availability of 
exchange partners (Cook 1977). Under conditions of re- 
source scarcity, one method for attaining the goal of un- 
certainty reduction is through the use of interorganiza- 
tional exchanges (Levine and White 1961). An alliance 
may be particularly important when no alternatives for 
reduction of uncertainty or dependence are available. In 
their study of the relationships and linkages in the health 
care industry, Levine and White (1961) argued and found 
that interdependence will be even greater for those or- 
ganizations that do not have the ability to obtain their 
resources and hence reduce their uncertainty outside of 
the current network of relationships. In this case, the al- 
liance may be sustained simply to help in uncertainty re- 
duction, even though performance from the relationship 
is not enhanced. 
In examining the dependence of organizations on each 
other, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that dependence 
is made up of three elements: (1) importance of the re- 
source being obtained, (2) the discretion of the use of the 
resource, and (3) the absence of alternatives for obtaining 
the resource. Building on this work, Heide and John 
(1988), in their study of dependence balancing in mar- 
keting channels, expand the notion of fewer alternatives 
to include both fewer current alternatives as well as fewer 
potential alternatives. 
The options approach proposed by Kogut (1991) de- 
velops the perspective that joint ventures are created as 
"real options" to expand into future technological devel- 
opments or markets. Because these options offer flexibil- 
ity and increased opportunities for firms in following a 
strategic course of action, firms often incur extra expense 
just to keep alternatives open (Harrigan and Newman 
1990). Multiple alternatives have the effect of reducing 
an organization's dependence on any one alliance or 
course of action. Additionally, although an organization 
may have many alternatives open, economic constraints 
make it likely that not all of the opportunities will be 
pursued. Thus, the number of options available is likely 
to affect the commitment to any one alliance. Those 
members with more options available will have more 
choices for investment and, consequently, will be less de- 
pendent on any one alliance and more likely to leave any 
one alliance, especially when it no longer fits the strategic 
need of the partner. Thus, dependence on any one alliance 
will reduce the strategic flexibility firms have in exiting 
the relationship. 
Likewise, partnerships based on dependence may not 
be conducive to flexibility in modifying the terms of the 
agreement. When one party is dependent on the other, the 
other is said to have power in the relationship (Emerson 
1962). Because of this, the more powerful partner may 
have no motivation to adjust to changes. Under this sce- 
nario, flexibility of the relationship may not be a result. 
Thus, the dependence of the partner on the alliance will 
be negatively related to the strategic flexibility of that 
alliance, in terms of both modification and exit. 
HYPOTHESIS 5a. Dependence is negatively related to 
the strategicflexibility of an alliance, measured in terms 
of modification. 
HYPOTHESIS 5b. Dependence is negatively related to 
the strategic flexibility of an alliance, measured in terms 
of exit. 
Sources of Trust 
The construct, trust or trustworthy behavior, is a common 
element in both transaction cost economics as well as 
social exchange theory. Behavioral scholars have adopted 
the assumption that most exchange partners are trustwor- 
thy and that trust will exist in exchange relationships even 
if economic safeguards against opportunism are not in 
place. However, economic theorists argue that because 
economic actors have the potential for opportunistic be- 
havior, safeguards must be in place to ensure trustworthy 
behavior (i.e., lack of opportunistic behavior). While this 
lack of opportunistic behavior is not consistent with a 
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social exchange theory view of trust which argues that 
trust evolves out of past experience and current interac- 
tion (Deutsch 1973, Rempel et al. 1985) and is not the 
result of economic hostages, both theories share a com- 
monality. Trust, according to social exchange theory, and 
lack of opportunistic behavior, according to transaction 
cost economists, have reliability and predictability of ac- 
tion as a basis for their definitions. 
Social Exchange Theory and Trust. Lewis and 
Weigert (1985) contend that trust is characterized by a 
cognitive "leap" of faith beyond the expectations that rea- 
son and experience alone would warrant. Thus, where 
opportunism might be rationally expected, trust prevails. 
It should be noted that hostage exchanges in the form of 
specific assets or other types of economic hostages avoid 
trust by structuring the transactional context in such a way 
that opportunism becomes irrational. The importance of 
this distinction is important to our understanding of trust. 
Trust, according to social exchange theorists, is not a re- 
sult of contracts, credible commitments, or hostages be- 
cause these require no "leap" and are actually more de- 
scriptive of situations requiring little or no trust. In other 
words, activities can be coordinated through either con- 
tracts or trust or a combination, but the differences should 
be kept clear. 
The social exchange literature suggests that two main 
sources of trust exist. One is a result of reputation while 
the other resides in sharing similar values. The first, rep- 
utation, requires knowledge of previous relationships or 
may develop over time as partners continue to interact. 
The reputational source of trust involves both previous 
relations and length of attachment. The second main 
source of trust, shared values, requires only current 
knowledge about one's partner to the exchange and may 
be transmitted through the current exchange process. The 
sharing of values involves communication as well as an 
understanding of the goals and values of the partner. 
Previous Relations. The knowledge that an organi- 
zation can be trusted is based, in part, on that organiza- 
tion' s reputation. This reputation can be established either 
through previous relationships or alliances (e.g., Gulati 
1995, Hladik 1988) or over time as the length of the at- 
tachment between the partners increases (Seabright et al. 
1992). Shared experiences between firms can engender 
trust among the partners, resulting in closer bonds. The 
idea of trust and commitment emerging from prior contact 
has been a common theme in much of the literature in- 
volving social exchange and trust (e.g., Blau 1964, Cook 
and Emerson 1978, Lewis and Weigert 1985, Luhman 
1979, Zucker 1986), and has been examined in the liter- 
ature at both the intraorganizational (e.g., McAllister 
1995, Zand 1972) and interorganizational levels 
(Anderson and Weitz 1989, Gulati 1995, Hladik 1988, 
Larson 1992, Parkhe 1993, Ring and Van de Ven 1992). 
The implication of all of these studies is that trust devel- 
ops between partners over time and is intimately tied to 
past experiences. This firm-specific information concern- 
ing prior exchanges provides data about the trustworthi- 
ness of the exchange partner. Similarly, Ring and Van de 
Ven (1992) propose that reliance on trust between orga- 
nizations can be expected to emerge only when they have 
successfully completed transactions in the past and they 
perceive that the partner has acted equitably. Conse- 
quently, it is expected that the existence of previous re- 
lationships with the current partner is positively related 
to trust. 
HYPOTHESIS 6. The existence of previous relation- 
ships with any partner companies is positively related to 
to trust among partners in a strategic alliance. 
Attachment. Attachment refers to the prior history of 
a particular exchange relationship. Similar to the argu- 
ments for previous relationships over time, as time goes 
on in a relationship, partners come to know whether the 
other partner can be trusted. Increased attachment has 
been found to be positively related to commitment to the 
relationship with the assumption being that, among other 
things, trust has developed. Cook and Emerson (1978), 
in their work on social exchange, argue that attachment 
is a distinct attribute of interorganizational relationships. 
Scanzoni (1979) argues that one reason why older dyads 
continue is that experience breeds trust. Through previous 
actions, a foundation is laid for trust. Seabright et al. 
(1992) address the importance of attachments in interor- 
ganizational relationships. While not directly testing the 
impact of attachment on trust, their argument is consistent 
with that which specifies that trust develops over time. 
Consequently, it is proposed that attachment will be pos- 
itively related to trust. The longer the parties have been 
together in a particular alliance, the more they will trust 
each other. 
HYPOTHESIS 7. Attachment between the partners to 
the alliance is positively related to trust among partners 
in a strategic alliance. 
Communication. One factor leading to trust is the 
level of communication between partners. Communica- 
tion "can be defined broadly as the formal as well as in- 
formal sharing of meaningful and timely information be- 
tween firms" (Anderson and Narus 1990, p. 44). Support 
for the relationship between communication and trust ex- 
ists in both intra- and interorganizational research. Inter- 
action frequency was found to be positively related to 
affect-based trust (McAllister 1995) between managers 
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and their peers. Lorenz (1988) argues that personal con- 
tact allows for easier exchange of information. This in 
turn allows the partners to learn about the other person's 
idiosyncrasies and develop an understanding between the 
parties. In short, communication allows for the exchange 
of information such as shared values, goals, and objec- 
tives, key factors related to trust. Consequently, it is ex- 
pected that communication (in quantity and quality) will 
be positively related to trust. 
HYPOTHESIS 8. The level and quality of communi- 
cation between the partners in a strategic alliance is pos- 
itively related to organizational level trust in the partner 
company. 
Shared Values. While reputation is an important in- 
dicator of the trustworthiness of an exchange partner, it 
is by no means the only indicator. This assumes that part- 
ners have transacted in the past. Does this mean that there 
is no trust possible between those partners exchanging for 
the first time? Borrowing from the social-psychological 
literature, trust can also be a function of a person's faith 
in another. This faith is often a result of shared values 
(Zucker 1986). Shared values refers to the extent that 
partners to an exchange have common beliefs regarding 
the importance of the motives for transacting as well as 
the goals and objectives of the exchange. Dwyer et al. 
(1987) theorize that shared values contribute to the de- 
velopment of commitment and trust in marketing rela- 
tionships. Empirical support for this relationship between 
shared values and both commitment and trust is found by 
Morgan and Hunt (1994). Additionally, trust develops in 
part as a result of a partner's interpretation of his or her 
counterpart's motives and intentions (Kelley 1979). 
Related to the idea of shared values is that of cultural 
similarity. Zucker (1986) has proposed that one of the 
three central modes of trust, character-based trust, relies 
on social or cultural similarity. The argument is that oth- 
ers with social similarity may be sought out for exchanges 
under the premise that many background understandings 
will be common to parties to the exchange and, conse- 
quently, that the outcomes of the transaction will be more 
satisfactory to both parties. The background understand- 
ings she refers to are similar in concept to the shared 
values and behavioral norms discussed above. Social sim- 
ilarity, she argues, allows norms to be shared across a 
group of individuals or firms. With the exception of 
Gulati (1995) who utilizes Zucker's (1986) theory of cul- 
tural similarity, little research has been done that exam- 
ines the relationship between cultural similarity and trust 
in strategic alliances. Gulati argues that domestic alli- 
ances should exhibit more trust, due to cultural similarity, 
and would be less likely to need to use equity to structure 
the alliance relationship. While not specifically testing the 
relationship between similarity and trust, he does find that 
international alliances are more likely to be equity based 
than domestic alliances. 
Consequently, it is expected that the existence of 
shared values between the organizations, in the form of 
cultural similarity and sharing of goals and objectives, 
will be positively related to trust. 
HYPOTHESIS 9. The existence of shared values be- 
tween the organizations is positively related to organi- 
zational level trust. 
Transaction Cost Economics and Trust. In describing 
trust, Williamson (1993) makes a distinction between cal- 
culative, personal, and institutional trust. The first, cal- 
culative, refers to a "rational form of trust fostered by 
mutual hostages and other economic commitments." The 
second, personal trust, does not depend on calculations of 
self-interest for its formation or continuation, and applies, 
according to Williamson, only in personal relationships. 
Finally, institutional trust derives from the social and or- 
ganizational embeddedness but in fact, according to 
Williamson (1993) is calculative as well. Barney and 
Hansen (1995) describe these first and third types of "cal- 
culative" trust as "semi-strong" trust and argue that when 
the cost of opportunistic behavior is greater than its ben- 
efit, it will be in the rational self-interest of exchange 
partners to behave in a trustworthy manner. That is, trust- 
worthy behavior and, consequently, trust between part- 
ners are a result of rational decision making in their own 
economic interest. Similar to Williamson (1993), this is 
the type of trustworthy behavior emphasized in most eco- 
nomic models of exchange and has been most commonly 
referred to as a lack of opportunistic behavior. According 
to Cummings and Bromiley (1996), part of the reason we 
may trust our partner is that we know that our partner 
works within a control system that makes it very hard to 
benefit from acting opportunistically. 
Economists, then, assume the existence of opportunis- 
tic behavior in economic partnerships. Thus, when an or- 
ganization believes that a partner engages in opportunistic 
behavior, such perceptions will lead to decreased trust. 
However, as discussed previously, economic constraints 
such as hostages and balanced asset specificity may serve 
to decrease the perceived opportunistic behavior of the 
partners by increasing the reliability and predictability of 
their behavior. As such, we would expect a positive re- 
lationship between these economic constraints and trust 
between the partners. 
HYPOTHESIS 10. Economic commitments in the form 
of balanced asset specificity are positively related to trust 
among partners in a strategic alliance. 
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HYPOTHESIS 11 . Economic commitments in the form 
of hostages are positively related to trust among partners 
in a strategic alliance. 
Dependence and Trust. A primary consequence of 
dependence is power. Dependence varies with the value 
received (i.e., importance) from a partner and inversely 
with the availability of alternative trading partners (Cook 
and Emerson 1978). The exercise of power by one partner 
(based on dependence of the other) may lead to a part- 
ner's acquiescence. However, the continuing exercise of 
power to gain acquiescence will promote dysfunctional 
conflict and destroy trust (Lusch 1976). As suggested 
from the above discussion, the relationship between de- 
pendence and trust has been discussed in very negative 
terms. Consequently, it is proposed that dependence will 
be negatively related to the level of trust between the 
partners. 
HYPOTHESIS 12. Dependence is negatively related to 
trust among partners in a strategic alliance. 
Model Specification, Data Collection, 
and Research Methods 
Model Specification 
To test the hypotheses in this study, we specified two 
models using the maximum likelihood estimation proce- 
dure in LISREL VIII (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993): one 
for modification flexibility and another for exit flexibility. 
Structural equation modeling techniques are considered 
to be a major component of applied multivariate analysis 
(Marcoulides 1995). Structural equation modeling (SEM) 
techniques are particularly useful in theory development 
because they permit the researcher to propose and sub- 
sequently test theoretical propositions about interrelation- 
ships among variables in a multivariate setting (Heck et 
al. 1990). In its broadest sense, SEM is concerned with 
testing complex models for structure of functional rela- 
tionships between observed variables and latent (hypo- 
thetically existing) variables. The functional relationships 
are described by parameters that indicate the magnitude 
of the effect (either direct or indirect) that independent 
variables have on dependent variables. Thus, a structural 
model may be viewed as a guide that allows the re- 
searcher to assess the relative strength of each variable 
included in explaining a desired set of outcomes. The 
models tested in this study were posited a priori to ex- 
amine the specific factors that impact the flexibility of a 
strategic alliance in terms of modification and exit. 
A structural equation model can be translated in the 
LISREL program into a mathematical model with two 
fundamental parts. The first is known as the measurement 
model. This is the model that specifies the relationships 
between the observed variables (e.g., four measures of 
trust) and the underlying constructs they are hypothesized 
to measure, referred to as latent variables (e.g., overall 
trust). The second is known as the structural model. The 
structural portion of the model allows the latent constructs 
to be tested for relationships that have been theoretically 
proposed. 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) suggest the use of a two- 
stage approach to structural equation modeling. This al- 
lows for a more accurate picture of the relationship be- 
tween the theoretical constructs without it being blurred 
with the results of the measurement model. The first stage 
is to determine the adequacy of the measurement model 
before analyzing the second part of the model, the struc- 
tural component. Prior studies by Young and Marcoulides 
(1997) utilizing this sample found high confirmatory evi- 
dence for the measurement model and the observed latent 
constructs utilized in this study. For this study then, we 
utilized item parsing by collapsing multi-item measures 
to create unidimensional measures representing the latent 
construct. As a consequence, the results presented in this 
study will emphasize the second stage of structural equa- 
tion modeling, the structural model. To construct the vari- 
ous factors presented below (and collectively in Figure 1, 
below), the common method of item parcelling (much 
like constructing a scale) was used. Item parcelling has 
multiple advantages over using individual items as indi- 
cators (e.g., Rindskopf and Rose 1988). Of key concern 
for the present investigation, parcelling allows for the es- 
timation of fewer parameters in the measurement model, 
ensuring that the estimates will be more stable in small 
samples (West et al. 1995). 
The proposed model specifies factors that together 
comprise visible aspects of organizations that influence 
strategic alliance flexibility. In this specific case, the out- 
comes of interest are modification and exit flexibility. The 
determinants of modification and exit flexibility are con- 
ceptualized on the basis of transaction cost economics 
(i.e., asset specificity, balanced asset specificity, hostages) 
and social exchange (i.e., trust, dependence) theories. As 
recommended by Harris and Schaubroeck (1990), mul- 
tiple observed indicators were used to measure all of the 
latent variables included in the model (see section titled 
"Definition and Measurement of the Variables"). 
Sample 
A sample of high technology strategic alliances occurring 
during the 1987-1994 period were chosen where at least 
one of the partners was U.S.-based, the alliance involved 
research in the area of information technology (IT), and 
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the alliance was either a joint development agreement 
(JDA)-two or more firms working together on new tech- 
nology or products-or a joint research pact (JRP)-the 
joint undertaking of research projects with shared re- 
sources. 
By focusing on IT alliances, this study uses a relatively 
homogeneous sample which controls for other external 
factors that might impact the relationships being inves- 
tigated. The selection of IT JRPs and JDAs was chosen 
because of the unique nature of their activities and gov- 
ernance. JRPs and JDAs involve a sharing of technology 
or joint development without the joining of the companies 
in an equity-type of arrangement such as a joint venture. 
The unique nature of this sample allows us to focus on 
strategic alliances where flexibility is considered to be of 
utmost importance given the dynamic nature of techno- 
logical and competitive change. The uncertainty associ- 
ated with R&D alliances involving information technol- 
ogy often requires skills, such as flexibility, that may not 
be as essential in other types of industries or alliances. 
From an initial sample of 291 strategic alliances, a final 
sample of 132 alliances involving 241 firms resulted, due 
to the elimination of firms wherein data was not available, 
the alliances never took place or took on another form 
such as a licensing agreement, or there was no key infor- 
mant. Callbacks and refaxing yielded 91 completed sur- 
veys (38% of 241). This response rate is consistent with, 
or even greater than, research using survey data to ex- 
amine interorganizational relationships (e.g., Anderson 
and Narus 1990). 
Care was taken in this study to ensure that the inform- 
ants in this sample of alliance partners were selected 
properly. However, their knowledge and involvement 
were assessed via self-reports, which could be a limitation 
of this sample. In particular, some researchers have ques- 
tioned the ability of key informants to report validly (e.g., 
Philips 1981), though others (e.g., Brown et al. 1990) 
have argued that a single, reliable informant is preferred 
over multiple respondents with varying familiarity with 
the phenomenon. To overcome this limitation and to be 
able to examine the reliability of the responses from the 
key informant, a shortened version of the questionnaire 
was sent to secondary informants. An analyses of these 
questionnaires was conducted to examine the reliability 
of the primary respondents and found no significant dif- 
ferences between the primary and secondary respondents 
on the measures used in this study. Consequently, the 
primary respondent from each company was considered 
to be a reliable informant. 
Definition and Measurement of the Variables 
Table 1 reports the item wording and Cronbach's alphas 
for the measures used in this study. 
Strategic Flexibility. For this study, flexibility con- 
sists of both the ability to modify the current relationship 
as well as the ability to exit an alliance performing poorly. 
To measure the first type of strategic flexibility, modifi- 
cation, respondents were asked to rate on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale three statements reflecting the partners' 
ability to adjust and modify the agreement as needed 
(Heide and John 1992). These measures were a reliable 
indicator of the first type of flexibility and were collapsed 
to form one measure (Cronbach's alpha = 0.81) to be 
included in the analysis. 
For strategic flexibility as measured by exit, only those 
respondents that rated their company' s satisfaction below 
the mean (41 firms) were included in the analysis. To 
assess flexibility in terms of the relative ease of exit from 
an alliance, respondents were asked to rate on a seven- 
point Likert-type scale the probability of their organiza- 
tion terminating the alliance relationship within the next 
year. In the case where an organization had already ter- 
minated the relationship, they were assigned a "seven." 
As suggested by Parkhe (1993), it is important to assess 
any possible unanticipated negative or positive conse- 
quences of the partnership. Respondents were asked to 
rate on a seven-point Likert-type scale any unanticipated 
positive or negative outcomes for their company. Addi- 
tionally, consistent with Harrigan (1988) and Parkhe 
(1993), a partner's overall evaluation of the alliance's 
performance was obtained by asking informants to rate, 
on a seven-point Likert-type scale, two statements reflect- 
ing the performance of the alliance. Each was asked to 
rate the extent to which the alliance has fulfilled their 
organization's expectations and the alliance's effective- 
ness. These measures were collapsed (Cronbach's alpha 
= 0.74) to get one overall assessment of performance. 
Asset Specificity. Informants were asked to categorize 
the assets their organization contributed to the alliance 
into intangible (administrative personnel and technical 
personnel) and tangible (technical equipment, facilities, 
and financing). Additionally, respondents were requested 
to indicate for all types of assets contributed, the per- 
centage of those assets that could easily be transferred for 
use elsewhere. These two sets of measures were collapsed 
into one: the degree of asset specificity (for both intan- 
gible and tangible assets) in the alliance. 
Balanced Asset Specificity. Balanced asset specificity 
represents the degree to which the partners in the alliance 
have invested equivalent specific assets into the relation- 
ship. Respondents were asked to indicate the reciprocal 
assets invested by their partner in the same manner as 
above. A calculation was made to compare the balance 
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Table 1 Measurement Instruments 
Cronbach's 
Measures and Items alpha 
Strategic Flexibility: Modification (Scale 1-7: Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)** 0.81 
1. When an unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather modify the agreement than hold each other to the origi- 
nal terms. 
2. Flexibility in response to requests for changes is a characteristic of this alliance. 
3. The parties expect to be to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope with changing circumstances. 
Strategic Flexibility: Exit 
1. What is the probability of your company terminating this alliance within the next year? (Scale 1-7: Very Low-Very High) 
2. Performance** 0.74 
Alliances often result in unexpected outcomes. Some can be negative (e.g., leakage of proprietary information) while others 
may be positive (e.g., development of unanticipated new market). To what extent has this alliance resulted in: 
a. unanticipated positive outcomes for your company? (Scale 1-7: Not at All-Extensively) 
b. unanticipated negative outcomes for your company? (Scale 1-7: Not at All-Extensively)* 
c. fulfilled expectations? (Scale 1-7: Not at All Satisfied-Completely Satisfied) 
d. overall effectiveness (Scale 1-7: Not At All Satisfied-Completely Satisfied) 
Asset Specificity 
1. Which of the following assets has your company dedicated specifically to this alliance? (Yes/No) 
a. Intangible assets (Administrative Personnel and Technical Personnel) 
b. Tangible assets (Technical Equipment, Facilities, and Financing) 
2. If yes, were the alliance to dissolve today, what percentage of each of your company's assets could be transferred for 
use elsewhere? 
Balanced Asset Specificity 
1. Which of the following assets has your partner company dedicated specifically to this alliance? (Yes/No) 
a. Intangible assets (Administrative Personnel and Technical Personnel) 
b. Tangible assets (Technical Equipment, Facilities, and Financing) 
2. If yes, were the alliance to dissolve today, what percentage of each of your partner company's assets could be trans- 
ferred for use elsewhere? 
Hostages (Yes/No) 
1. Currently, which of the following types of relationships does your company have with your partner company? 
* Trade Association Membership 
* Contracting/Licensing 
* Manufacturing/Marketing Joint Ventures 
* R&D Joint Ventures 
* R&D Consortia 
* Other (Yes/No) 
Trust (Scale 1-7: Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)** 0.86 
1. When we encounter difficult and new circumstances, my company does not feel worried or threatened by letting our 
partner company do what it wants. 
2. My company is familiar with the patterns of behavior our partner company has established, and we can rely on them to 
behave in certain ways. 
3. We have found that our partner company is unusually dependable. 
4. Our partner company cannot be trusted at times.* 
Power/Dependence: Influence (Scale 1-7:No Influence-A Great Deal of Influence)** 0.82 
1. How much influence does your company have, relative to that of your partner company, on the following decisions? 
a. Alliance goals 
b. Alliance operating decisions 
c. Budget allocations 
d. Selection of research projects 
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Table 1 (Continued) Measurement Instruments 
Cronbach's 
Measures and Items alpha 
Power/Dependence: Alternatives 




* Joint Venture 
* Other Types of Alliances 
2. If no for any, please indicate your company's potential for using these arrangements for conducting the alliance's activ- 
ities. (Scale 1-7: Low Potential-High Potential)* 
Power/Dependence: Importance 
1. The nature of the activities conducted by this alliance are similar/dissimilar to your company's primary focus? (Scale 1- 
7: Similar-Dissimilar) 
Previous Relationships 
1. Has your company previously been engaged with your partner company in other alliances? (Yes/No) 
2. If yes, how many years did the previous alliance last? 
Attachment 
1. How long has your company been involved in this alliance? (Measured in months) 
Communication (Scale 1-7: Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)** 0.89 
1. We always keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party. 
2. It is expected that any information that might help the other party will be provided to them. 
3. It is expected that proprietary information will be shared if it can help the other party. 
4. Exchange of information in this alliance takes place frequently and informally, not only according to a prespecified 
agreement. 
Shared Values (Scale 1-7: Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)** 0.91 
1. Our goals and objectives for this alliance are shared by our partner company. 
2. Our partner company had similar motives for forming this alliance. 
*Reverse Coded 
**Reliability indicated for these multiple-item measures. 
of asset specificity for both intangible and tangible in- 
vestments by taking the absolute difference of the part- 
ners' specific assets invested. Here, a "zero" indicated a 
perfectly balanced set of investments. 
Hostages. Similar to Kogut (1989), hostages was op- 
erationalized as concurrent relationships that an organi- 
zation has, in addition to the focal alliance, with their 
partner organization. Informants were asked to specify 
which of five types of relationships their organization 
concurrently had with their partner company. If any con- 
current relationship existed between the partners then a 
hostage arrangement between the partners was considered 
to exist and was coded as a "one." When no hostage ar- 
rangement existed, a code of "zero" was used. 
Trust. Measures of trust were drawn from the litera- 
ture on both interpersonal trust (Johnson-George and 
Swap 1982, Larzelere and Houston 1980, McAllister 
1995) and interorganizational trust (Anderson and Narus 
1990, Morgan and Hunt, 1994). After modifying the 
statements to reflect the nature of the alliance activity, 
respondents were asked to rate, on seven-point Likert- 
type scale, four statements reflecting their organization's 
trust in their partner organization. These measures re- 
flected the three components of trust used in much of the 
interpersonal trust literature (i.e., dependability, predict- 
ability, and faith). The measures were collapsed to reflect 
one overall measure of trust for inclusion in the model 
(Cronbach's Alpha = 0.86). 
Power/Dependence. Using the definition of depen- 
dence suggested by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), our mea- 
sure of power/dependence is composed of three elements: 
(1) the influence in the use of the resource, (2) the absence 
450 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE/Vol. 10, No. 4, July-August 1999 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CANDACE YOUNG-YBARRA AND MARGARETHE WIERSEMA Strategic Flexibility in IT Alliances 
of alternatives, both current and potential, and (3) the im- 
portance of the resource being obtained. To measure in- 
fluence, respondents were asked to rate on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale four statements concerning their orga- 
nization' s influence over the following alliance decisions: 
goals, operating decisions, budget allocations, and the se- 
lection of research projects. These measures were col- 
lapsed into one measure of influence to be included in the 
model (Cronbach' s Alpha = 0.82) 
To measure the absence of alternatives, respondents 
were asked whether their organization was currently able 
to conduct the alliance activities in any of four alternative 
arrangements and they were asked to rate on a seven- 
point Likert-type scale their organization's potential for 
conducting these activities (if they weren't already doing 
so). 
Importance of the resource being obtained was con- 
ceptualized in terms of the criticality of the resource. A 
resource is considered critical when that resource is a key 
part of the focal organization's operations or function or 
to the extent to which the organization requires it for 
operation or continued survival (Blau 1964, Emerson, 
1962, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) Thus the alliance will 
be more critical, and therefore more important, to the or- 
ganization when the alliance is conducting research that 
is directly related to the organization's primary research 
interests. 
Previous Relationships. Consistent with Gulati 
(1995) and Anderson and Weitz (1989), respondents were 
asked whether or not their organization had previously 
partnered with their current partner. Additionally, this 
study included another element by asking how long the 
relationship(s) lasted. The importance of this additional 
element is clear. A previous short-lived alliance may not 
have the desired effect as some researchers assume (i.e., 
increased trust) but may actually act to decrease the trust 
if the alliance was dissolved prematurely. 
Attachment. Attachment refers to the length of the 
current relationship. Using the same operationalization of 
attachment as Seabright et al. (1992), respondents were 
asked to indicate how long (in months) their organization 
had been involved in the focal alliance. 
Communication. The quality of the communication 
between partners to an exchange is related to the trust that 
develops in that relationship (Moorman et al. 1993). Con- 
sequently, respondents were asked to rate on a seven- 
point Likert-type scale four statements reflecting the qual- 
ity of communication between the organizations. These 
measures are consistent with those used by marketing 
channels researchers (e.g., Heide and John 1992, Mohr 
and Spekman 1994). Preliminary analyses indicated that 
these four measures of communication quality were 
highly related (Cronbach's alpha = 0.89); hence, for fur- 
ther analysis in the overall model, they were collapsed 
into one variable: communication. 
Shared Values. Two separate aspects of this construct 
were measured. First, consistent with Gulati (1995), we 
categorize the alliance as either multinational or domestic 
(1 = all partners from the U.S., 0 = multinational alli- 
ance). Consistent with previous research examining the 
relationship between shared values and trust (Morgan and 
Hunt 1994), it was requested that the respondent rate on 
a seven-point Likert-type scale their organization' s agree- 
ment concerning two statements reflecting the degree to 
which the partners have a common understanding of the 
motives for joining, and the goals and objectives of the 
alliance. These two statements were highly correlated 
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.91) and were combined into one 
variable: shared goals. Consequently, the construct shared 
values is composed of both shared nationality and shared 
goals. 
Findings 
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for the 
measures used in this model. 
Assessment of the Structural Model 
Figure 1 (modification flexibility) and Figure 2 (exit flex- 
ibility) are the a priori structural models we tested, with 
significant parameter values indicated. The full results of 
the structural models are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The 
parameter estimates are indices that represent the simul- 
taneous contribution of each latent variable to the model. 
Also included are the error terms for the structural equa- 
tions. In standardized form, error coefficients represent 
the proportion of variance in each equation not accounted 
for in the structural model. The error coefficient for mod- 
ification flexibility is 0.26 and 0.37 for exit flexibility. 
Because our models were defined a priori, our primary 
interest is in the model fit. Once the model fit is deter- 
mined, the significance of the various parameter estimates 
can be ascertained (Marcoulides 1989). Without a signifi- 
cant model fit, however, we would have to reconceptual- 
ize our models. The assessment of the fit of the models 
is revealed by examining the goodness of fit index (GFI 
= 0.93 for modification and 0.90 for exit), the adjusted 
goodness of fit index (AGFI = 0.90 for modification and 
0.88 for exit), and the normed index (NFI = 0.95 for 
modification and 0.92 for exit). It is generally recognized 
that GFI, AGFI, and NFI values above 0.90 indicate a 
satisfactory model fit. For these models, these indices all 
suggest a good model fit. Because the models were de- 
termined to fit the data reasonably well, we can now as- 
sess more thoroughly the significance of the empirical 
validation of our hypotheses. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Constructs 
Construct Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Strategic Flexibility 
1. Modification 4.24 1.66 
2. Exit 4.37 1.97 0.20 
Transaction Cost Economics 
3. Asset Specificity-Intangible 36.41 25.14 -0.37 -0.63 
4. Asset Specificity-Tangible 29.2522.36 -0.33 -0.31 0.19 
5. Balanced Asset Specificity- 
Intangible 28.78 13.31 0.42 0.13 0.18 0.24 
6. Balanced Asset Specificity- 
Tangible 32.2422.11 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.26 
7. Hostages 0.84 0.37 0.55 0.11 0.22 0.17 0.12 0.08 
Social Exchange Theory 
8. Trust 4.09 1.44 0.69 0.47 -0.02 0.11 0.33 0.29 0.46 
9. Influence 3.88 1.42 0.40 0.06 -0.13 -0.14 -0.08 0.09 0.07 0.40 
10. Alternatives 3.19 2.04 0.13 0.32 0.07 0.18 0.13 0.19 -0.01 0.15 0.08 
11. Importance 4.32 1.84 0.07 0.45 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.13 -0.240.11 0.10 0.12 
12. Previous Relations 5.12 3.31 0.11 -0.27 0.06 0.10 -0.01 0.21 0.270.17 0.11 -0.13 -0.28 
13. Attachment 52.46 36.20 0.34 -0.44 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.090.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.22 
14. Communication 4.79 1.50 0.60 0.51 -0.14 0.04 -0.23 -0.16 0.35 0.79 0.18 0.04 -0.17 0.17 0.09 
15. Shared Values 4.82 1.53 0.71 0.42 -0.16 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.51 0.77 0.28 0.08 -0.15 0.21 -0.040.46 
Assessment of the Hypothesized Relationships 
Influence of Transaction Cost Economics. As shown in 
Figures 1 and 2, the results for transaction cost economic 
theory show mixed results. Contrary to Hypothesis la, 
asset specificity is negatively related to strategic flexibil- 
ity of the alliance, measured in terms of modification. 
Additionally, asset specificity is negatively related to the 
strategic flexibility of the alliance, measured in terms of 
exit, providing support for Hypothesis lb. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, balanced asset specific- 
ity (intangible assets) is positively related to the strategic 
flexibility of an alliance, measured in terms of modifica- 
tion. This result provides support for the role of mutual 
commitments in providing an incentive to maintain the 
relationship through modification or mutual adjustment. 
Additionally, this supports the previous discussion that 
suggested intangible assets are more likely to provide an 
even stronger lock-in to the relationship than tangible as- 
sets. 
For the relationship between hostages and strategic 
flexibility, results indicate that the existence of hostage 
arrangements was positively related to strategic flexibility 
of the alliance, measured in terms of modification, thus 
confirming Hypothesis 3a. However, we found no support 
for Hypothesis 3b in which we proposed a negative re- 
lationship between the existence of hostages and strategic 
flexibility, measured in terms of exit. 
Influence of Social Exchange Theory. Factors sug- 
gested by social exchange theory have a significant influ- 
ence on strategic flexibility. Trust is significant and pos- 
itively related to modification flexibility, strongly 
supporting Hypothesis 4a. Likewise, we found a signifi- 
cant and positive relationship between trust and flexibil- 
ity, measured in terms of exit, providing strong support 
for Hypothesis 4b. 
The results for the role of dependence on the flexibility 
of an alliance provide strong support for Hypotheses 5a 
and 5b, which proposed that dependence is negatively 
related to strategic flexibility in terms of modification 
(Hypothesis 5a) and exit (Hypothesis 5b). Two of the 
three measures of dependence, influence and alternatives, 
were significant and negatively related to modification 
flexibility, while alternatives and importance were sig- 
nificant and negatively related to flexibility, measured in 
terms of exit. The six significant links affirm the impor- 
tance of social exchange theory factors in influencing 
strategic flexibility in alliances. 
Sources of Trust 
Social Exchange Theory and Trust. In examining 
sources of trust in terms of social exchange theory, the 
findings indicate that communication and shared values 
were significant factors influencing trust. Previous rela- 
tions and attachment, however, were not significantly re- 
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Figure 1 Structural Model of Modification Flexibility 
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lated to trust, disproving Hypothesis 6, in which it was 
proposed that the existence of previous relationships with 
the current partner(s) would be positively related to trust 
among partners in a strategic alliance. Attachment was 
also found not to be related to trust. In other words, the 
length of time that partner organizations have been to- 
gether had little or no impact on the trust developed be- 
tween the organizations. This is inconsistent with predic- 
tions in Hypothesis 7. The results indicate support for 
Hypothesis 8. The level and quality of communication 
between the partner organizations was found to be posi- 
tively related to trust in the partner company. Hypothesis 
9 was confirmed in the analysis. The shared values be- 
tween the organizations was found to be positively related 
to trust. 
Transaction Cost Economics and Trust. Results of 
the proposed relationships among the theoretical deter- 
minants of flexibility revealed an interesting set of 
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Figure 2 Structural Model of Exit Flexibility 
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interrelationships. In examining the relationship between 
factors suggested by transaction cost economics and trust, 
as shown in both Figures 1 and 2, we found a positive 
relationship between three factors suggested from trans- 
action cost economic theory-balanced asset specificity 
(both tangible and intangible), hostages, and trust. This 
provides support for Hypotheses 10 and 11, which pro- 
posed a positive relationship between economic commit- 
ments in the form of balanced asset specificity and hos- 
tages and trust between the partners in a strategic alliance. 
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Dependence and Trust. The results examining the re- 
lationship between dependence and trust provide support 
for Hypothesis 12, which proposed a negative relation- 
ship between dependence and trust. Specifically, a neg- 
ative relationship was found between one specific mea- 
sure of dependence, influence on decision making in the 
alliance, and trust between the partners. 
Discussion 
Exploring the influence of transaction cost economics and 
social exchange theory on the strategic flexibility of al- 
liances involving joint research pacts and joint develop- 
ment agreements showed that, in general, factors from 
transaction cost economics provided flexibility in modi- 
fication but not in exit. Generally, trust was found to be 
positively related to flexibility while the other component 
of social exchange theory, dependence, was found to be 
negatively related to the strategic flexibility of the alli- 
ance. 
This study found mixed support for the role of trans- 
action cost economics in the strategic flexibility of an 
alliance. The investment of specific assets, both tangible 
and intangible, was found to have a detrimental impact 
on the strategic flexibility of alliance relationships. This 
provides evidence of the inertia or lock-in associated with 
the commitment of resources that have little or no use in 
other settings and is consistent with results found by re- 
searchers examining forces leading to continuity in the 
relationship. However, when the assets contributed by 
both parties are considered, a different result is found. 
When both parties have equivalent specific assets at stake, 
they are likely to strive to modify the arrangement to keep 
it going. And yet, when the alliance does not satisfy the 
partner, these assets will serve to lock the partners into 
the relationship. Previous research has not adequately ex- 
plored this construct, which is unique to dyadic relation- 
ships. The significant results indicate that it is important 
to consider both partners' contributions. The relative im- 
portance of the assets contributed may serve to align the 
interests of the parties involved. This alignment of inter- 
ests cannot be determined by looking at only one side of 
the assets contributed. Similarly, hostages, which have 
been described as another type of economic commitment, 
will provide flexibility in modifying the arrangement, but 
no significant relationship was found with regard to exit 
barriers. Thus, while mutual economic hostages, in the 
form of specific assets or current relationships with the 
partner, encourage partners to modify the current arrange- 
ment to protect their investments, the flexibility to exit is 
not provided. This last finding is in direct contrast with 
Table 3 Parameter Estimates for Structural Model of 
Modification Flexibility (Figure 1) 
Hypothesized Standardized 
Following/Leading Constructs Sign Solution t-value 
Modification Flexibility 
Asset specificity (Intangible) + -0.29 3.23** 
Asset specificity (Tangible) + -0.25 2.83** 
Balanced asset specificity + 0.31 3.84** 
(Intangible) 
Balanced asset specificity + 0.11 1.01 
(Tangible) 
Hostages + 0.47 4.49*** 
Trust + 0.60 5.35*** 
Dependence 
Influence -0.32 3.912** 
Alternatives -0.27 3.01 1** 
Importance 0.15 1.74 
Trust 
Previous Relations + 0.14 1.59 
Attachment + 0.04 0.48 
Communication + 0.51 4.87*** 
Shared Values + 0.62 5.62*** 
Balanced asset specificity + 0.28 3.1 1** 
(Intangible) 
Balanced asset specificity + 0.24 2.793* 
(Tangible) 
Hostages + 0.49 4.72*** 
Dependence 
Influence - 0.31 3.839** 
Alternatives 0.12 1.22 
Importance 0.09 0.90 
***p < 0.001 
**p < 0.01 
*p < 0.05 
Kogut (1989), who found a positive relationship between 
the existence of hostages and the continuation of the focal 
alliance. However, Kogut (1989) did not examine contin- 
uation in terms of flexibility to exit the relationship when 
it may no longer satisfy the partner, but rather considered 
total exiting firms. 
Strong relationships were found for the role of social 
exchange theory in explaining the flexibility of an alli- 
ance. Trust was found to be related to flexibility in mod- 
ifying the current arrangement and even in exiting a 
poorly performing alliance. This result is consistent with 
those researchers who have argued for the role of trust in 
developing adaptable arrangements. Here, adaptability 
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may go so far as to allow partners to dissolve the current 
relationship in favor of a later more effective arrange- 
ment. 
Consistent with arguments in the literature on depen- 
dence, this study found a negative relationship between 
a partner's dependence on the alliance and the flexibility 
of the alliance. Specifically, fewer alternatives for con- 
ducting the alliance's activities and low influence in de- 
cision making were related to lower flexibility. This result 
is consistent with Harrigan and Newman (1990), who ar- 
gued that alternatives reduce dependence on any one 
course of action and that firms may incur additional ex- 
penses to keep these alternatives open. 
In examining the various sources of trust suggested by 
transaction cost economics and social exchange theory, 
this study found that trust, or the predictability of one's 
behaviour, is associated with the level of economic com- 
mitments in the form of balanced assets invested and hos- 
tages. In other words, partners with similar assets at stake, 
and those with other current relationships with their part- 
ner, are more likely to be able to rely on the behavior of 
their partner. This is consistent with Cummings and 
Bromiley (1996), who argue that incentive and control 
systems constrict the behavior of the partners, thereby 
producing a trusting relationship. Likewise, as suggested 
by social exchange theory, the quality of communication 
and the existence of shared values between the partners 
is positively related to trust. This type of trust is similar 
to the "strong form" discussed by Barney and Hansen 
(1995). 
In summary, it is important to understand the impli- 
cations of the various theories in addressing flexibility. 
Consistent with transaction cost theory, as well as evi- 
denced in many current alliances, commitments, or long- 
lived alliances are often manipulated by demanding high 
mutual investment of resources, by involving 
relationship-specific assets, or by taking other economic 
"hostages" (Williamson 1985). However, these findings 
suggest that economic commitments may tend to create 
organization inertia and undermine autonomy and flexi- 
bility. Consequently, asset specificity and dependence 
may need to be minimal in certain relationships because 
of the desirability to have highly versatile and flexible 
alliances, particularly in very uncertain environments. 
Thus, the flexible strategic alliance may need to make less 
use of capital and resource dependencies to obtain com- 
mitment and may instead rely on trust in structuring the 
relationship, as social exchange theory suggests. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature 
on the effective use of strategic alliances for competing 
in uncertain and turbulent environments. First, this study 
Table 4 Parameter Estimates for Structural Model of Exit 
Flexibility (Figure 2) 
Hypothesized Standardized 
Following/Leading Constructs Sign Solution t-value 
Exit Flexibility 
Asset specificity (Intangible) - 0.50 4.53*** 
Asset specificity (Tangible) -0.24 2.61* 
Hostages 0.09 0.79 
Trust + 0.35 3.89** 
Dependence 
Influence - 0.08 0.71 
Alternatives - -0.27 2.73** 
Importance - -0.40 4.34*** 
Trust 
Previous Relations + 0.12 1.03 
Attachment + 0.05 0.44 
Communication + 0.53 4.79*** 
Shared Values + 0.61 5.21*** 
Balanced asset specificity + 0.29 3.01** 
(Intangible) 
Balanced asset specificity + 0.23 2.42* 
(Tangible) 
Hostages + 0.51 4.60*** 
Dependence: 
Influence -0.30 3.15** 
Alternatives - 0.11 0.91 
Importance - 0.10 0.79 
***p < 0.001 
**p < 0.01 
*p < 0.05 
utilizes factors from both transaction cost economic the- 
ory and social exchange theory to provide a more thor- 
ough understanding of flexibility in strategic alliances. 
Secondly, this study is the first to examine strategic flex- 
ibility in a setting involving two important and widely 
used types of strategic alliances, joint development agree- 
ments and joint research pacts. Additionally, it is the first 
to examine two important dimensions of strategic flexi- 
bility in alliances, the ability to modify the arrangement 
and the ability to exit the relationship when the alliance 
is performing poorly. Finally, this study examines im- 
portant interrelationships among the determinants of flex- 
ibility suggested by transaction cost economics and social 
exchange theory. Specifically, it explores the sources of 
trust, or trusting behavior, suggested by both transaction 
cost economic theory and social exchange theory. 
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